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Abstract
This paper uses a unique dataset from Denmark to examine the impact of owners’ family char-
acteristics (size, gender composition, divorce, etc) on the decision to appoint internal (family) or
external chief executive officers (CEOs). In contrast to common perceptions, we find that condi-
tional on observing family CEO transitions, within cohort (spouse, siblings) successions are at least
as prevalent as subsequent generation transitions. When assessing the impact of family charac-
teristics on subsequent generation CEO appointments, we find that the probability of observing a
family succession increases with the number of children, decreases with the ratio of female children,
and decreases with divorce, particularly when it is accompanied with a new marriage and a new
family. To show that these results are not spurious, we use instrumental variables. Overall, we find
that family dynamics play a significant role in firm decision-making even when families are not the
sole owner of these firms.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, a significant body of work has shown that the Berle and Means’ (1932)
view of firms with separated ownership and control is not a widespread description of publicly
traded firms. Evidence of ownership concentration, particularly around families, by La Porta, et al.
(1999) indicates that families control 53 percent of publicly traded firms with at least $500 million
in market capitalization in 27 countries.1
Research on the impact of families on firm performance is mixed. Morck, et al. (1988) find
a positive effect of family management for young firms but a negative correlation for old firms.
Yermack (1996) finds a negative effect of a founding family CEOs and Morck, et al. (2000) and
Perez-Gonzalez (2003) find performance for family CEOs who inherit their positions. In contrast,
McConaughy, et al (1998) find a positive impact of family CEOs and Anderson and Reeb (2003) find
a positive correlation between founding family ownership and firm profitability and M-B ratios, and
conditional on family ownership, a positive correlation between these performance measures and
family CEOs. Finally, Villalonga and Amit (2004) find that founding families enhance value only
when founders are active either as executives or directors of the corporation but hurt valuations in
descendant CEOs firms.
Less known, empirically, are the specific mechanisms through which families affect firm de-
cisions, and the particular circumstances under which these instruments differ relative to other
large investors (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)) whose sole (main) objective is maximizing “explicit”
cash-flow returns, or relative to individual owners whose families are not involved in the business.
Existing literature in other areas of economics suggests that inside-the-family dynamics might
be influential for firm decision-making when there is a blurring line separating families and firms.
Economists have long acknowledged that the crucial role of family structure on other important
economic decisions, such as, labor supply decisions, human capital investments, portfolio choice,
housing demand, etc.2
Consistent with this idea, there is a large body of anecdotal evidence suggesting that corporate
1Evidence of the prominent role of families in publicly traded firms has also been provided by Morck, et al. (2000)
for Canada, Claessens, et al. (2002) for East Asian countries, and Faccio and Lang (2002) for Western Europe. In
the U.S., family ownership is present in 35 (37) percent of firms in the Standard and Poor’s (Fortune) 500, where
families hold an average of 18 (16) percent of shares (Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2004)).
2See Becker (1993) and the survey by Browning (1992).
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decisions in family firms are affected by the structure of its controlling family. According to Ward
(1987) “family circumstances critically influence the choice of business strategy”. Gersick et al.
(1997) highlight the potential conflict between business logic and parents’ fairness considerations
when assessing ownership inheritances or expansion strategies. A recent example from S.C. Johnson
& Company illustrates the point: Samuel Curtis Johnson, the controlling shareholder, divided the
firm in three legally independent firms and gave one to each one of his three interested children to
avoid potential conflicts among siblings.3
To date, there is little systematic evidence on the link between family structure and family
circumstances and corporate decisions. Yet, recent work suggests that family dynamics might be
key for performance. For example, Perez-Gonzalez (2003) shows that families’ preference for within
family CEOs in a sample of U.S. publicly traded firms are associated to large declines in operating
performance and valuation when family CEOs did not attend selective undergraduate institutions,
but that such correlation does not exists for unrelated promotions. Bertrand, et al. (2004) use data
from 69 Thai business groups to document that the size of families is correlated with higher family
involvement in management positions and that the higher the male ratio within a family the lower
the operating performance of groups, which is potentially consistent with family conflicts.
In this paper we examine the impact of family structure on firms’ succession decisions using a
unique dataset from Denmark. These dataset allows us to identify the universe of Danish firms, the
families behind them and their family characteristics. In consequence, we are able to improve upon
Perez-Gonzalez (2003) in that we can observe the full family tree (potential family candidates) and
not just whether a family CEO is promoted, and upon Bertrand et al (2004) in that we have a panel
of firms and family characteristics that we are able to follow over time, not only a cross-section,
which will allows us to control for firm-invariant heterogeneity, and relative to both, in that we
observe (1) the universe of firms in a country and not only a small non-random sub-sample, and
(2) a large array of family characteristics that have never been explored in this literature. Finally,
we also improve on the large pre-existing management literature (Levinson (1971), Barnes and
Hershon (1976), Gersick et al. (1997), Lansberg (1999) and Ward (1987)) by providing systematic
evidence on many of the arguments and insightful cases discussed therein.
The dataset includes balance sheet and selected income statement figures for all limited liability
3New York Times, August 22, 1999.
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firms in Denmark from 1995 to 2002. The data also reports the names of top management and
board members, and, in many cases, information on the ownership structure of firms. The dataset
is unique in that we were able to link these owners and managers’ to detailed information about
their families and their family characteristics. In particular, we are able to obtain information
about the number, age, gender, and marital status of current or prior spouses, siblings, parents,
and offspring. Overall, we have family tree information for approximately one million individuals
(roughly 20 percent of Denmark’s population).
Our sample includes 40,811 firms, 74 percent (30,145) of which are classified as family controlled.
A firm is classified as family controlled when as one individual or family owns at least 50 percent
of ownership. When we focus on transitions, we identify that 3,657 of these family controlled firms
observed a CEO transition during the 1995-2002 sample period. Surprisingly, 75 percent of all
transitions yield an unrelated CEO successor. This ratio was unexpected given the large ownership
concentration around owners, and that in the US, around 40 percent of firms where a member of
the founding family retires as CEO, promote as successor a family heir (Perez-Gonzalez (2003)).
Also contrary to what is typically assumed in the literature, we find that in 52 percent of all CEO
transitions where control remains inside the family, the top management post passes to members
of the same family cohort (typically the spouse or a siblings) of the departing CEO. In only in 41
percent of family transitions, control shifts to the next generation (in the remaining 7 percent of
cases, control passes to the generation prior to the acting CEO (typically parents)).
Our main findings related to family structure and CEO successions are three.
First, the probability of observing a family succession increases first in the number of children
but it turns negative for families with four or more kids. The evidence might be indicative that
gains from improved quality of the CEO pool are substantial when moving from one to two (or two
to three) children. Yet, as the number of heirs increases further, family conflicts or sibling rivalry
reduce the probability of observing a family succession.
One might be concerned that this result could be driven by unobserved family or firm char-
acteristics that jointly affect fertility and succession decisions. This would occur, for example, for
parents with a taste for large and closely knit families, or in firms where interpersonal information
-which arguably is more easily transferred to family members- affects firms’ and fertility outcomes
(number of children would then be endogenous).
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We address this criticism in two ways. Following Angrist and Evans (1998), we instrument for
family size using variation in the number of children from families where the first two kids are
of the same gender. Given that parents tend to exhibit a preference for variety in offspring’s sex-
composition, they will be more likely to have a third child after two consecutive girls/boys than those
families whose first two children were a girl and a boy. In consequence, this is a valid instrument
because family size varies as a function of offspring’ gender (more likely to have a third child) in a
way that is unlikely to be correlated to family or firms’ unobserved characteristics that might affect
the decision to appoint a family CEO. Alternatively, we examine succession decisions of firms whose
founders started their firms 10 years after having their last child. While this approach does not
deal with parent unobserved preferences and their potential impact on the probability of observing
a family succession it does reduce concerns that firms unobserved characteristics determined both
fertility and succession decisions.
Both approaches confirm that the probability of observing a family succession initially increases
with the number of children. However, the effect turns negative for the fourth and subsequent
children. The evidence confirms that family size does have a causal effect on the probability of
observing a family succession.
Second, we show that the gender composition of children affects family succession decisions.
In particular, we find that family transitions are significantly less likely to occur in families where
all children are female. This is surprising given Denmark’s reputation for being one of the most
egalitarian societies in the world. Yet, might not be unexpected given the evidence (and recent
heated debate) on the lower female to male participation in certain highly time-demanding jobs.
Third, we find that family conflicts, as measured by the number of marriages of the founder
or the existence of children with multiple partners, are associated to negative and statistically
significant decline in the probability of observing within family successions. Prior work (Gersick
et al. (1997) has indicated that family complexity, such as a higher number of branches within
a family, can affect firm decisions. In the setting of succession, family branches can reduce the
chances of observing a family CEO if the head of the family anticipates sibling infighting or if
the relevant offspring do not agree on one family CEO. Furthermore, we show that the correlation
between family succession and the owner’s number of marriages is not driven by reverse causality, by
conflicts between the owner and previous spouses, and by the direct effect of divorce. Consistent
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with the multiple factions or family politics arguments, we find that the strongest reduction in
the probability of family transition occurs when the owner not only has been married more than
once, but also has children with multiple spouses. The findings suggest that sibling rivalry might
be particularly intense across family branches and that this rivalry is more important for firms’
succession decisions than spouses conflicts.
Overall the paper presents detailed evidence that family characteristics can affect firms’ decision-
making and that with-in cohort family successions are important when thinking about family firms.
The evidence shows that family firms should not be thought as a single economic agent but rather as
a complex organization within the controlling shareholding interest. Given the prevalence of family
ownership around the world (Laporta et al (1999)) and arguments by family firm scholars that cross
country differences in the prevalence of family firms might be traceable to family characteristics
(Gersick (1997)), we think that further understanding the complexities of families behind firms,
and the particular circumstances that make family firms different, are fruitful areas for further
research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data. Section II provides
stylized facts. Section III presents the empirical strategy and Section IV describes the main results
of this paper. Section V concludes.
2 Data description
In this section we describe the sources of data and the procedures we followed to construct our
dataset. We also provide descriptive statistics.
2.1 Firm data
We use two sources of firm data. The first is Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau’s dataset
(“KOB” dataset). KOB is a private firm that uses the annual reports that all limited liability firms
are required to file with the Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs to compile this dataset. The
dataset contains accounting, management and ownership information of all the registered limited
liability joint stock companies in Denmark.4 These annual reports include items from firms’ income
4In addition to the limited liability joint stock company form (Aktieselskabet) firms can also register as a An-
partsselskab, which is similar to the the German GMBH or the US S-corporation. We exclude this latter corporate
form from the analysis due to lack of data.
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statement (e.g. sales, profits) and balance sheet (e.g. book value of assets, debt and equity). Firms
are also required to furnish the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs with the name of the
CEO and all current board members. Finally, firms are required to file ownership information.
Although the official requirement is that firms list the names of shareholders with an equity stake
above 5%, many firms also include the actual stakes of the large shareholders. In 65.9% of the firms
we can account for 90% or more of the voting rights. For firms with two or more shareholders the
corresponding figure is 29.6%. KOB started this dataset in 1995 and the last year available is 2002.
Because each annual report has to include accounting information for the previous three years, we
have accounting data from 1993 to 2002. However, for all other data the window is 1995 to 2002.
The second source comes from the agency Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen under the Ministry
of Economic and Business Affairs (“E&S” dataset). Under Danish company law, when a firm is
founded, it must report the name of the founders, the CEO and all board members to this agency.
In addition, firms are required to file any change in the CEO and board positions with the agency
within 2 weeks of the actual change. The E&S dataset is compiled from all these reports. Even
though firms have been required to file these reports for many decades, the dataset is available in
electronic format only since 1986. As a result, for firms founded after 1986, we have information
about the founders, CEOs (current and past) and board members (current and past). However,
for firms founded before 1986 we do not have information on founders or on board members that
have not been replaced from 1986. Practically, this is not a serious limitation. Because the KOB
dataset also contains the names of all board members from year 1995 to 2002, we can ascertain
how many board members are not present in the E&S dataset. The figure is smaller than 5%.
Even though the board member information is already in the KOB dataset, we use the E&S
dataset because, in addition to the names of CEOs, board members and founders, the E&S dataset
contains their CPR number, a personal identification number similar to the Social Security number
in the United States. We were able to get the CPR numbers, although for privacy reasons, these
are not available to the public.
We restrict our sample to closely held joint stock companies that are both in the KOB and E&S
datasets in the window from 1995 to 2002. We use consolidated accounting information for firms
with 100% owned subsidiaries. When other corporations hold stakes in a firm, we go back to get
the ultimate owners. Since we have the entire universe of Danish firms, the corporate owner of a
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firm in our sample is very likely to be in our sample as well.5
2.2 Family data
Our source for family information is the CPR agency in the Ministry of Interior, the government
department that administers the CPR numbers. For every person whose CPR number we submit,
this agency provides us with the name, address, date of birth and date of death (if any). We also get
the names and CPR numbers of the person’s immediate relatives: parents, siblings, and children.
In addition, we obtain the entire history of marriages and divorces: names and CPR numbers of
current and previous spouses and dates of marriages and divorce.
Since the focus of our study is on family ownership, we need to construct the family tree for the
owners of the firm. The KOB database has ownership information. Unfortunately, this database
only has the names of the owners but not the their CPR number. Thus, we cannot link the KOB
dataset with the information provided by the CPR agency. The E&S dataset does have CPR
numbers, but it does not have the list of owners. To solve this problem, we proceed as follows.
Form the E&S dataset, we obtain the names and CPR numbers of current and all past CEOs,
current and past board members, and founders and submit their CPR number to the CPR agency.
In this first round we submit almost 352,000 CPR numbers. In a second round, we submit the CPR
numbers of the immediate relatives of the people in the first round. Thus we are able construct an
extended family tree with grandparents, cousins, etc. The total number of individuals for which
we have data is approximately 1 million. This is equivalent to around 20% of the current Danish
population. Next, for each firm, we construct a list that pools all family members of the CEOs
(current and past), board members (current and past), and founders. Using the names, we try to
match owners (from KOB) to this list of family members. We can assign a CPR number to all the
owners that we match. With the CPR number we gain access to the family tree information. Our
matching procedure is very efficient. In about 87.2% of the firms, we are able to match at least one
owner.6
5Except when the corporate owner is a non-Danish corporation or in the very few cases in which the corporate
owner have not complied with the law and has not filed an annual report with the Ministry of Economic and Business
Affairs.
6It is important to get family information for CEO board members and founders before matching owners to
increase the efficiency of the marching procedure. It is common, for example, for a parent to retain ownership but to
have his children run the firm. In this case, the children but not the father appears in the E&S database. However,
because we obtain the name and CPR number of all people with family relations to persons in E&S, we will be able
to match the father.
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Conditional on getting the CPR number, our methodology to identify family members is more
precise than using the last name. For example, our method can identify daughters that have
changed their last name, sons and daughters in law, cousins with different last names, and even
partners who are not married but have joint children.7
3 Descriptive statistics
3.1 Family and non-family firms
We first identify family firms. In most of the following analysis we classify a firm as a family firm
if the members of a single family hold more than 50% of the voting shares. Non-family firms are
those in which no single family holds a majority of the voting shares. These can be firms in which
no family holds more than 50% of the voting shares or firms in which the majority shareholder
is a foundation, a foreign corporation or the State. We only classify firms with personal owners
as non-family firms when we can check, using the family tree information provided by the CPR
agency, that the owners are not family members. When we do not have the complete family tree
for all shareholders (for example because we were not able to match the name of the owner with the
E&S dataset) we classify the firm as undecided. In this category we also include firms for which we
do not have the actual distribution of ownership stakes of the owners and firms where the control
contest is tied (i.e, two families holding 50% each).
We use a 50% threshold for control as opposed to the lower thresholds (10% or 20%) used in
empirical analysis of publicly held corporations. The reason for this difference lies in the different
ownership structures of closely held and publicly held firms. In a publicly held firm, a shareholder
with a large minority stake, say 10% to 20%, can have effective control because the rest of the
shareholder are so dispersed that collective action problems prevent them from exercising their
control. However, because the number of shareholders in a close corporation is smaller (in our
sample the average number of shareholders is only 1.73), it is less likely that shareholders will face
severe collective action problems and, as a result, a 50% stake is needed to achieve control (see
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000).
There are several definitions of family firms (see, e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2004). They include
7We identify partners who are not married but have children (a common family situation in Denmark) because,
in the first round we get the name and CPR number of the child and in the second step, when we submit the child’s
CPR number, we get the name of both parents, whether or not they are married.
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different combinations of family ownership, management, and control. Our definition is based only
on control. The ownership dimension is not particularly useful in the context of closely held
corporations. If we were to apply the definition that a family firm is one in which a family holds a
large stake, say 20% or larger, we would end up classifying most firms as family firms. Regarding
the management dimension, we show in section 6, that our results are unchanged when we use a
more strict definition of family firm that requires that a family both control the firm and some of
its members be involved in management.
Table 1 shows the number of firms that fall in each category for the year 2002. Out of a total of
47,355 corporations in that year, we classify 77.5% as family firms, 5.6% as non-family firms, and
we were not able to classify the remaining 17%. We further classify family firms into two groups.
The fist group is composed of family firms in which a single member of the family is a shareholder.
In the second group, there are more than one member of the controlling family in the ownership of
the firm. Because defining family variables (number of children, marital status, etc.) is easier and
less controversial when it refers to a single individual, we use mostly the first group in the analysis
that follows.
Table 1 shows that a large fraction of the closely held firms in Denmark are controlled by a single
family. Family firms are prevalent across all firms sizes –although they are more common among
the smallest firms– and all ages (tables not shown). When we separate firms into size quintiles,
family firms appear more often in the smallest quintile (82.5%) but they are still very prevalent in
the largest quintile (67%). Regarding age, family firms constitute 74.7% of the firms in the younger
age quintile and 80% of the oldest.
Table 1 also shows that family firms appear to be slightly more profitable. The average ROA
for all family firms (single owner and multiple owner) is 5.5% compared with 5.2% for the non-
family firms. In terms of number of owners, family firms have fewer shareholders. Of course, this is
expected because firms with a single shareholder are classified as family firms under our definition.
However, even conditional on the number of shareholders being two or higher, the number of
shareholders is lower for family firms. Finally, Table 1 shows that there is a significant overlap




In most of the paper we focus on the decision to transfer of CEO position to a family member or
to an manager outside the family. We identify changes in the CEO position from one year to the
next by comparing the CPR number of the CEO in adjacent years. In section 6 we show that our
results are unchanged when we focus on ownership transition.
On average, about 1% of family firms have a CEO transition in a given year. The reason why
this number is so low (compared to the corresponding number for publicly held firms) is that all
recently incorporated firms appear in the dataset. Thus, our dataset contains a large fraction of
very young firms that never make it to their first succession. Table 2 shows the number of CEO
transitions in every year from 1995 to 2002. Panel A shows all the CEO transitions in family firms
that we are able to identify. Panel B shows the number of CEO transitions in firms for which we
have the complete family tree information of the controlling family. We have 3,169 transitions in
family firms in which a single member of the controlling family is a shareholder and 522 transitions
in family firms in which multiple members of the controlling family are shareholders. We use the
sample of 3,169 transitions in most of the following analysis.
Table 3 shows firm and family characteristics by the identity of the new CEO. Out of 3,169
transitions, 794 (25%) are family transitions. Within this category, 325 are transitions to the next
generation (children, step children and children in law), 415 transitions are to a family member
in the same generation (spouse and siblings) and 54 are to a relative of the previous generation
(parents).
Comparing firm characteristics, Table 3 shows that firms in which the new CEO is a family
member are considerably smaller, older and less profitable than firms in which the new CEO is an
outsider. In terms of family characteristics, owners of firms that name a CEO from the family are
less likely to be divorced, less likely to have been married multiple times and have significant more
children than owners of firms in which the new CEO is a non-family member.
4 The effect of family structure on succession
In this section we consider the effect of family structure (number of children and gender composition)
on the succession decision.
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We use two measures of the endogenous variable CEO transition. One is Family transition to
all generations, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the new CEO belongs
to the controlling owner’s family. There is a potential problem with this variable, namely that
transitions to family members of the same generation might not be a final decision but can be a
temporary arrangement until the next generation is old enough tot manage the firm. Supporting
this conjecture is the fact that Table 3 shows that the number of adult children at the time of “lateral
transitions” is significant lower than the number of adult children at the time of a transition to the
next generation.
To address this problem, we drop all family transitions to both the same generation and the
previous generation and define the variable Family transition to next generation, which is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one when the new CEO is a child, step child or child in law of the
controlling owner.
4.1 Univariate analysis
Table 4 shows the probability of family succession conditional on the number of children (panel A)
and the number of adult children (panel B). The probability of transition increases monotonically
as the number of children is raised from 0 to 3 in both panels and for both measures of family
succession. In 3 out of the four cases, the probability of family succession decreases for controlling
shareholders having four or more children.
The positive impact of children is not surprising. With more children, there is a higher prob-
ability that one of them will be talented enough and willing to take over the CEO position. The
negative impact of the fourth and subsequent children is puzzling. It could be that, from the point
of view of the children, the higher number of siblings reduces the probability of getting the CEO
position and hence negatively affects incentives to invest in the human capital necessary to run the
firm. This rises the probability that, at the time of succession, no child is capable of taking the
reins of the firm. Another possibility is related to the fact that, typically, the ownership of the
firm is evenly split among all the children. talented children will not be willing to commit their
human capital to the family firm for a small fraction of the proceeds. Currently, we are testing
these hypothesis.
Moving to gender composition, Table 5 shows the probability of family transition conditional
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on children’s gender composition. Panel A shows that family transition is less frequent in families
in which all children are females. This result is stronger for the variable Family transition to the
next generation: in families with at least one male offspring the family transition frequency is close
to 17.2%, whereas in families in which all children are female this probability is only 6.9%. In panel
B, we confirm this pattern by restricting attention to children above 20 years.
4.2 Multivariate analysis
Table 6 present two sets of multivariate probit analysis. The first three columns of Table 6 show
the result of a probit analysis on the variable family transition to the next generation. Because
families with no children do not have the option of family transition to the next generation, we
drop them from these regressions. The last three columns show the results of a probit analysis on
the variable family transition to all generations on the unrestricted transition sample.
We use two specifications for number of children and gender distribution. In the first specifi-
cation we define Number of adult children as the number of children of the controlling family aged
20 or above at the time of the transition. We also include number of adult children squared. We
add a gender dummy, All adult children are females. Our second specification measure number of
male and female children independently.8
In columns 3 and 6 we use the first specification and add a number of controls. Firm size is
book value of assets measured in million Danish kroner (equivalent to 135,000 euros). Firm age
is measured as number of years since the firm was established. Profitability is industry adjusted
returns on assets, defined as operating profit over book value of assets minus the mean 2-digit SIC
industry return on assets. Industry competition is the Herfindahl-Index, which sums the squares
of each firm’s market share within the industry. Our last two control variables are: Old CEO in
Family and Gender composition of industry workforce. The former is a dummy that takes the value
of one when the departing CEO belongs to the controlling family. The latter variable measures the
ratio of women in the industry workforce.
In all specifications, the insights from the univariate analysis are confirmed. In columns 1,3,
4, and 6, Number of adult children is always positive and highly significant. This effect is also
economically significant. Ignoring the quadratic effect, one additional child around the average of
8In addition to the presented table using children above 20 years, we did also run the regressions using the number
of children independently of their age. This did not change the results presented in the tables.
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approximately 2 children increase the likelihood of family transition to children by almost 20%.
Number of adult children squared is always negative and statistically significant implying that
the marginal effect of additional children on family transition eventually becomes negative. The
dummy variable for all adult children are daughters is negative and statistically significant.
In columns 2 and 5, both number of adult sons and number of adult daughters are positive
and significant. However, the coefficient on number of sons is around two times the coefficient on
number of daughters.
In terms of the control variables, the most significant results relate to size and industry concen-
tration. Larger firms and firms in competitive industries are less likely to be transferred to a family
member. This could be driven by the fact that managerial ability is more important in these firms
and so the family simply chooses the person with the highest ability. Only in rare circumstances
will this person be a family member.
We sum up by concluding that our data shows a statistical correlation between management
transition on one side and the number of children, and gender composition of children on the other.
4.3 Causality
Our previous results do not prove a causal effect of number of children on family transition. The
correlation uncovered might be driven by the reverse causality or unobserved variables. It is possi-
ble, for example, that owners who want ensure a family transition in the future have more children
today. It is also possible that unobserved characteristics (e.g., being a ‘family man’ or a ‘family
woman’) drive both the high number of children and the family transition decision.
The issue of endogeneity of number of children in other economic decisions have been discussed
in the literature. The classical example is that the fertility decision is endogenous in a regression of
women’s labor supply. It is worth observing, however, that in our setting, the endogeneity problem
is potentially less severe. The fertility and the succession decision are taken, on average, 30-40 years
apart. Hence, it requires significant foresight of the young business owner to incorporate this at
the time that family size is decided. In contrast, in the example of women’s labor supply referred
to above, the participation and fertility decisions are taken simultaneously: a woman that can find
or has a job might decide not to have children.
In any case, we try to address the endogeneity problem as follows. We follow Angrist and Evans
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(1998) in instrumenting the number of children using gender composition of the first two children.
This is potentially a good instrument because the gender of the first two children is randomly
assigned. In addition, Angrist and Evans (1998) document that parents like to have children of
both gender. As a result, when the first two are of the same gender, the probability of having a
third one is higher. Because this argument only works for couples that are still married, we focus
on business owners who are married at the time of the transition and have two or more children.
These restrictions limit our sample significantly.
One potential problem with this instrument is that, although the gender composition of the first
two children is randomly assigned, we cannot rule out the possibility of a direct effect of gender
composition on family transition. To mitigate this concern, we control for the direct effect of gender
composition by adding two dummy variables: the gender of the first child and the gender of the
second child (not reported).
The results are presented in Table 7. The first 4 columns use transition to next generation as
the dependent variable and the last 4 columns show transition to all generations. We instrument
for the number of additional children. We notice that, in the first stage, our instrument is strongly
significant in all regressions with t-statistics between 6.23 to 9.34. More importantly the effect
of additional children on management transition is large, positive and significant at 1% and 5%
depending on the regression.
To confirm our results, we use a different instrument: wife’s age at time of marriage. This
instrument exploits the biological fact that fertility is decreasing with the age of a woman. In
particular, couples that marry when the woman is young are significantly more likely to have more
children. Thus, we construct a sample of family firms in which the owner is married and has not
been divorced and use wife’s age at time of marriage as instrument for number of children.
Table 8 reports the results from the OLS and 2SLS regressions. This instrument is strongly
correlated with the number of children (t-statistics in the first stage are between -3.09 and -9.06).
In addition, in all IV regression we obtain a positive and highly significant effect of number of
children.
Our last approach to address the endogeneity problem is to estimate a probit regression on a
sample of firms in which there is a 10 years time lag between the birth of the last child and the
foundation of the family firm. We expect the endogeneity problem to be mitigated in this sample.
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It is hard to believe that potential business owners choose the number of children in expectation of
a future management transition in a firm he or she plans to establish in 10 years time. We identify
1,308 family firms in this sample, which reduces to 1,072 when we add control variables. For the
transition to the next generation definition, we are left only with 581 transfers, which reduces to
473 when we add control variables.
We present our results in Table 9. The first two columns present probit regressions for family
transition to the next generation and the last two for family transition to all generations. The first
two columns paint a similar picture as all the results above. The same is true for the last two
columns, except that the quadratic term is not longer statistically significant.
Overall, using two different instruments and choosing a sample in which the potential endo-
geneity problem is mitigated, we still find the same effects of family structure on succession.
5 Family politics
This section investigates the possibility that family politics or conflicts affects the succession deci-
sion. There is a large body of anecdotal evidence suggesting that, in more complex families, family
succession becomes less likely.9 There are many potential explanation for this effect. First, there
is the well known aversion of the head of the family not to favor any of their relatives. If this
aversion is sufficiently strong, the head of the family might opt for an outsider. It is possible that
this aversion is stronger (and hence family transition less likely) when the potential candidates to
the CEO position belong to different branches of the family. Second, it could be that anticipating
fighting between the family branches, the head of the family decides to nominate an outsider.10
We do not have a large number of observations of firms in which the controlling family has
multiple branches.11 However, we have a fair number of cases of family firms in which the owner
9Gersick et al. (1997) note “It is easy to understand why so few companies, especially in the United States, thrive
under family control into the [third generation]. There are many forces that chip away the connections integrating
all the parts of the family business system: interpersonal conflict; distance and lack of common experiences; normal
family disruptions caused by death and divorce; and the increasing variability among family members in the financial
costs and benefits of staying involved” (page 53).
10Regarding the negative effect on performance of fighting among family branches, Gersick et al. (1997) note
“Although family constituent boards can be quite professional and effective, they tend to focus too much on the
personal interests of branches, rather than confronting tough strategic issues facing the company. Their membership
structure can be solely determined by rules about equalized family representation, without regard for qualifications
or potential contribution.” (, p. 52)
11The reason for this is that the CPR number was introduced in Denmark in 1960. Thus, CPR numbers are only
available for people who were alive at that time. This fact prevent us from constructing family trees going back many
generations.
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has been married multiple times. The family of the owner with each of the spouses approximates
the idea of family branches discussed in the literature. Also, because in Denmark it is common
for couples not to marry, we also look at family firm owners with children with one and multiple
partners. We start the next section with a univariate analysis.
5.1 Univariate analysis
Table 10 shows the family transition frequencies conditional on marital status. We divide the
owners into four marital groups: The first consists of owners who have never been married. Less
than 3% of the owners in this group have children and, on average, they are younger than the
other groups. The second group consists of owners who are married and have not been previously
divorced. The third group consists of owners who are currently divorced. Finally, the fourth
group consists of owners who have been married at least twice. Panel A shows that probability of
transition to the next generation is highest in the married group, slightly lower for the divorced
group and much lower for the group of owners with multiple marriages. Panel B shows that when
we focus on transfers to all generations, owners with multiple marriages have a lower frequency of
family transition relative to the owners who are still in their first marriage. The divorced and not
remarried group now has the lowest family transfer frequency. This is probably due to the fact that
there are fewer spouse to spouse transitions among the group of divorced owners.
The right hand side of Table 10 divides the owners depending on the number of partners with
which they have children (one or multiple partners). The frequency of generational transfer is
almost twice as large for owners with children from a single partner.
These univariate results are consistent with the idea that multiple branches reduce the proba-
bility of family succession.
5.2 Multivariate analysis
Table 11 presents the results of four probit regressions. The dependent variable is family transition
and we use the same set of covariates as in Table 6. In all regressions, the coefficient on the
variable Multiple Marriages is negative and significant at either the 1% or the 5% level. The sign
and statistically significance of the coefficients of variables measuring family structure remain the
same.
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5.3 Isolating the mechanism
We showed above that there is a negative correlation between Multiple Marriages and family
succession. We argued that this correlation is driven by the increase in the number of factions
inside the family. However there might be other reasons that explain this correlation. In this
section we eliminate other possibilities and analyze in more detail the precise mechanism by which
Multiple Marriages affect succession.
5.3.1 Reverse causality
It is possible that partners choose to divorce (which raises the probability of remarrying) because
of the anticipated outcome of the succession process. For example the spouse of the business owner
may stay in a marriage only because he or she wants to increase the likelihood that one of his or
her children will take over the CEO position later on. Realizing that the business owner will choose
an outsider may therefore provide the final incentive to leave the current marriage.
We have not been able to find a good instrument for multiple marriages. Hence, we choose
an alternative approach. We look at the impact of multiple marriages but require that the second
marriage began at least 5 years before the CEO transition. This should mitigate reverse causality
concerns. The results are presented in Table 12. This table shows that the effect of multiple
marriages is still negative and statistically significant.
We also run the regression with timelags of 3 and 10 years (not reported). In both cases we
confirm the results of Table 12, even though, as expected the results are more significant when we
use a 3 year lag than when we use a 10 year lag. This difference in significance are probably due
to the fact that when we use a 10 year lag, the sample is much smaller.
In sum, reverse causality does not appear to be driving the results.
5.3.2 Conflicts between parents
It is possible that multiple marriages is a proxy for conflicts between the family firm controlling
shareholder and his or her ex-spouse. Thus we can explain the correlation between multiple mar-
riages and family transition to the extend that conflicts between parents affect the probability of
transferring the firm to their children.
We test whether conflicts between parents affect the probability of family transition. One
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possibility is to use divorce as a proxy for conflicts between parents and run a regression of the
determinants of family transition including a dummy variable for whether the parents are divorced.
The problem with this approach is that it would be difficult to interpret the coefficient on the
divorce dummy: would it capture the effect of conflicts or the direct effect of divorce itself (e.g.,
divorce settlement). Moreover, while it is clear that before the divorce there are conflicts between
the parents, it is not clear whether the conflict still exist after the divorce.
To isolate the effect of parental conflicts, we construct a sample of all business owners who are
married at the time of the transition. We construct a dummy variable Divorce after the transition
that takes the value of 1 if a divorced occurred two years after the transition. Because it is very
likely that the conflicts that lead to divorce are present two years prior to the actual divorce, our
variable captures parental conflicts. Moreover, because the parents are not divorced at the time of
the transition, we can be certain that the coefficient is not driven by the direct effects of divorce.
Table 13 shows our results. Our variable for parental conflicts is insignificant when we analyze
transition to the next generation. Therefore, it appears that parental conflicts do not have an effect
on the probability of leaving the firm to the next generation. The coefficient on parental conflicts
is negative and statistically significant when the dependent variable is transition to all generations.
The reason is transition to all generations includes transition to an spouse. Obviously, there are
fewer transitions to an spouse in the presence of parental conflicts.
In sum, at least for transition to the next generation, parental conflicts are not a channel by
which multiple marriages affect the probability of family succession.
5.3.3 The direct effects of divorce
One last channel, not related to our factions in the family story, by which multiple marriages
can affect the probability of transition is that divorce itself (e.g., the divorce settlement) affects
succession. Because most of the owners who have been married more than once have had a divorce,
it is possible that the correlation we uncovered is driven by the direct effect of divorce on succession.
To address this concern, we constructed a sample of family firms with owners that have been
married at least once and created the dummy variable: Divorced but not remarried (the category
with no dummy attached is the sample of owners who are still married). We estimated a probit
using the standard set of covariates and this dummy variable (actually, in Table 14, we include
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two other dummies Multiple marriages with children with one partner and Multiple marriages with
children with multiple partners that we use in the next section). Results are presented in Table 14.
For transition to the next generation, the coefficient on Divorced but never remarried is statistically
insignificant. Thus, relative to owners who are still married, divorce has no effect on succession to
the next generation.
5.3.4 Multiple spouses and children with multiple partners
We further confirm our theory by testing additional implications that can be derived from it.
We propose that more than one faction in the family might lead to a lower probability of family
transition either because the head of the family is reluctant to choose from among two or more
different camps, or because an outsider will mitigate the inevitable fighting for the firm resources
among the factions. If any of these two stories is true, an additional implication is that the
probability of family succession should be even lower among the group of owners who have been
married more than once but that, in addition, have children with multiple spouses. Under the
first explanation, this is because an owner who has been married multiple times but has children
only with one spouse does not face the problem of choosing a child from different camps. Under
the second explanation, if these factions have, in addition to the spouse, other members, then the
fighting for resources could be more severe.
Table 14 shows the results. Both the coefficients on Multiple marriages with children with one
partner and onMultiple marriages with children with multiple partners are negative and significant.
However, the magnitude of the second coefficient is much larger (although the difference is not
statistically significant). In a second set of regressions, we define the dummy variables Multiple
marriages with sons with one partner and on Multiple marriages with sons with multiple partners.
Both coefficients are negative and significant, but now the difference is higher (however, it is still
not significant).
6 Robustness
We perform two robustness test. The first relates to the definition of succession. In the previous
analysis, we identified a succession with the change in the CEO position and defined a family
succession when the new CEO is a member of the controlling family. However, a succession will
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also involve transfer of the owner’s equity stake in the firm. We used this alternative definition
in Table 15. We defined a succession as the introduction of a new shareholder. We classified the
succession as a family succession when the new shareholder is a member of the controlling family.
Using this new definition, we estimated probit regressions similar to those in Table 6. The results
are shown in Table 15. As can be seen from this table, overall, the qualitative results are not
changed.
The second robustness test relates to the definition of family firm. To this end, we used a more
strict definition of family firm. In addition to requiring that a family control more than 50% of the
firm, we require that there be at least two members of the controlling family among the owners,
the CEO and board members. We estimated probits similar to those of page 6 in this subsample.
The results are shown in Table 16. Again, qualitatively, the results do not change.
7 Conclusions
This paper uses a unique dataset to investigate the effect of family structure and politics on the
decision whether to leave the firm to a family member. It shows that both structure and politics
of the family are statistically and economically important determinants of succession. In addition
the paper documents that there is a causal connection between these factors and succession. We
argue that understanding this decision is important because the identity of the successor has been
shown to influence performance.
More generally, the paper presents one example in which knowing the family behind the firm
is important to understanding corporate decisions. There are many other instances in which the
family plays an important role on the corporate side. For example, sibling rivalries are supposed to
reduce value, family members provide capital to the firm and thus share risk, etc. Studying these
other corporate decision from the viewpoint of the family behind the firm is left for future research.
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Table 1, Firm Characteristics in 2002 by Type of Control 
This table reports mean and (median) descriptive statistics of firms controlled by a family, firms in which no family has 
control, and firms we were unable to classify in either of these two groups.  We define control using a 50% (of votes) 
threshold.  We distinguish between two types of family-controlled firms: those in which only one family member is a 
shareholder and those in which multiple members of the family are shareholders.  The category unable to classify 
include firms we could not classify due to tied ownership (i.e. two families owning 50 pct. of the votes each) or missing 
information on the distribution of votes.  












N, firms (total = 47,355) 30,147 6,542 2,630 8,036 
Distribution (%) 63.7 13.8 5.5 17.0 
     








































CEO from the controlling family (%) 90.8 95.0   
     
 
Table 2, CEO Transitions in Family Firms, 1995-2002 
This table shows the number of CEO transitions that occurred in family controlled firms from 1995 to 2002. We define 
control using a 50% (votes) threshold.  We distinguish between two types of family-controlled firms: those in which 
only one family member is a shareholder and those in which multiple members of the family are shareholders. 
Panel A includes all family firms with a CEO transition between 1995 and 2002, whereas Panel B includes the sub-
sample of firms for which we were able to identify the family members’ CPR number and thereby obtain the complete 
























Panel A: All family controlled firms 
Single fam. Member owner 


















Panel B: Family controlled firms with complete family tree information 
Single fam. Member owner 

















         
 
 
Table 3, Family and firm characteristics of the sample of firms with a CEO transition 
This table shows descriptive statistics on family-controlled firms with a single family member as owner that experienced a CEO 
transition between 1995 and 2002 and for which we were able to obtain complete family information of the owners.  We also 
present information about the family behind the firm.  We define family transition as transitions to the next generation (children, 
step children and children in law), same generation (spouse and siblings) and to the previous generation (parents).  Adult children 
includes children that were aged over 20 or above at the time of the transition.  Panel A presents data on firm characteristics.  
Panel B presents data on the family behind the firm.  All family statistics relate to the family of the controlling owner. 













    
 
Panel A:  Firm characteristics 
Mean book value of assets in 1,000 € 1,062 825 530 901 1,718 1,511 
Mean firm age 18.7 12.5 8.6 14.8 13.1 13.5 
Mean return on assets (%) 5.7 6.8 1.0 6.0 6.5 6.5 
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       Number of children 2.43 2.08 0.98 2.15 1.74 1.84 
       Number of daughters  




























Table 4, Family Transition and Number of Children 
This table shows the frequency of family transitions in family-controlled firms in which a single member of the 
controlling family is a shareholder conditional on the number of children.  Under the columns labeled Family transition 
to next generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children in law. In these columns, 
CEO transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3). Under the columns 
Family transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of children, spouse, 
siblings and parents).  The frequency of family transition (%FT) is the number of firms with family transition over the 
total number of transitions.  In Panel A we count all children, whereas in Panel B we only count children that were aged 
20 or above at the time of the transition. 
Number of children Family transition to next generation  Family transition to all generations 
 N %FT N %FT 
 
Panel A, All children 
0 543 0.0 604 10.6 
1 349 9.7 413 23,7 
2 1,077 13.6 1,295 28.1 
3 552 19.9 648 31.8 
4+ 178 18.0 209 30.8 
All 2,699 12.0 3,169 25.1 
 
Panel B, Adult children  
0 1,233 0.6 1,426 14.0 
1 387 9.0 445 20.9 
2 684 21.6 831 35.5 
3 322 34.8 376 44.1 
4+ 73 31.5 91 45.1 
All 2,699 12.0 3,169 25.1 
     
Table 5, Succession and gender composition of children 
This table shows the frequency of family transitions in family-controlled firms in which a single member of the 
controlling family is a shareholder conditional on the gender composition of the owner’s children.  Under the columns 
labeled Family transition to next generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children 
in law. In these columns, CEO transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3). 
Under the columns Family transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of 
children, spouse, siblings and parents).  The frequency of family transition (%FT) is the number of firms with family 
transition over the total number of transitions.  Panel A we count all children, whereas Panel B we only count children 
that were aged 20 or above at the time of the transition.  
 Family transition to next generation  Family transition to all generations 
 N %FT N %FT 
 
Panel A:  All children 
At least one son 1,681 17.2 2,003 30.5 
All daughters 475 6.9 562 21.4 
All 2,156 14.9 2,565 28.5 
 
Panel B: Adult children 
At least one son 1,103 26.0 1,309 37.7 
All daughters 363 8.5 434 23.5 
All 1,466 21.7 1,743 34.1 
     
 
Table 6, The effect of family structure on succession 
Family transition is the dependent variable.  This variable takes the value of 1 when the CEO position is transferred to a 
family member.  We use two different definitions of family transition.  Under the columns labeled Family transition to 
next generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children in law. In these columns, 
CEO transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3). Under the columns 
Family transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of children, spouse, 
siblings and parents).  Number of adult children is the number of children of the controlling owner that were at least 20 
years old at the time of the transition.  All adult children are daughters is a dummy taking the value 1 when all adult 
children are female.  Number of adult sons and Number of adult daughters are the number of sons and daughters, 
respectively, that are at least 20 years old at the time of the transition.  Old CEO in family is a dummy taking the value 1 
when the departing CEO is a member of the controlling family.  Firm size is book value of assets measured in million 
Danish kroner (equivalent to 135,000 €).  Firm age is measured as number of years since the firm was established. 
Profitability is industry adjusted returns on assets, defined as operating profit over book value of assets minus the mean 
2-digit SIC industry return on assets.  Industry concentration is the Herfindahl-Index, which sums the squares of each 
firm’s market share within the industry.  Female share of industry workforce is defined as the share of female workers 
in the industry. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
 Family transition to next generation  Family transition to all generations 
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
       




















       
Number of adult sons  0.493*** 
(9.48) 
  0.376*** 
(12.9) 
 




  0.191*** 
(6.10) 
 
All adult children are 
daughters 
  -0.563*** 
(-4.58) 
  -0.028 
(-0.43) 
       












       
Firm size   -0.005** 
(-2.12) 
  -0.006*** 
(-3.59) 
Firm age   0.001** 
(2.09) 
  3E-04 
(0.80) 
Profitability   0.224 
(0.93) 
  0.290* 
(2.01) 
Industry concentration   0.902* 
(1.91) 
  0.920*** 
(3.17) 
Female share of 
industry workforce 
  -0.520 
(-1.86) 














       
Pseudo-R2 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 
N 1,466 1,466 1,203 3,169 2,617 2,617 
       
Note: In the ‘Transition to next generation sample’ we exclude single family owners with 0 adult children. Thus, the ‘Never married’ is dropped since 
all unmarried single owners have 0 adult children. 
Table 7, Succession decision with same gender dummy as the source of exogenous variation in family size 
The sample is constructed from family-controlled firms in which a single member of the controlling family is a 
shareholder.  Following Angrist and Evans (1998) we keep only the firms in which the owner is still married and has at 
least two adult children.  Family transition is the dependent variable.  This variable takes the value of 1 when the CEO 
position is transferred to a family member.  We use two different definitions of family transition.  Under the columns 
labeled Family transition to next generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children in 
law. In these columns, CEO transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3). Under 
the columns Family transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of children, 
spouse, siblings and parents).  The instrumented variable is Number of additional children which is the number of children 
in excess of 2.  The instrument is Same gender, defined as a dummy taking the value 1 when the first two children have the 
same gender. Similarly to Angrist and Evans (1998) we add two dummies for the gender of each of the first two children to 
the list of exogenous covariates.  All adult children are daughters is a dummy taking the value 1 if all adult children are 
female. Old CEO in family is a dummy taking the value 1 if the departing CEO is a member of the controlling family. 
Where indicated we include the following unreported control variables: Firm size, Profitability, Industry concentration and 
Female share of industry (see Table 6 for definitions).  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The table only reports the 
second stage regression for 2SLS. We report the t-statistic on the instrument, Same gender, from the first stage regression 
at the bottom of each panel. 
***, ** and * denotes significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 Family transition to next generation Family transition to all generations 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
 
Same gender dummy as instrument for Number of additional children 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
         




































         
















         
Control variables NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 

















         
t-statistic on instrument   (8.80)  (6.23)  (9.34)   (7.08) 
         
N 769 769 636 636 940 940 786 786 
Table 8, Succession decision with wife’s age at marriage as the source of exogenous variation in family size 
The sample is constructed from family-controlled firms in which a single member of the controlling family is a 
shareholder.  From this initial sample, we keep only the firms in which the owner is still married and has not been divorced 
at the time of the CEO transition.  Family transition is the dependent variable.  This variable takes the value of 1 when the 
CEO position is transferred to a family member.  We use two different definitions of family transition.  Under the columns 
labeled Family transition to next generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children in 
law. In these columns, CEO transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3).  
Under the columns Family transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of 
children, spouse, siblings and parents).  The instrumented variable is Number of adult children, which is the number of 
children that were at least 20 years old..  We use Wife’s age at marriage as an instrument.  All adult children are daughters 
is a dummy that takes the value 1 when all adult children are female. Old CEO in family is a dummy taking the value 1 if 
the departing CEO is a member of the controlling family.  Where indicated, we include the following unreported control 
variables: Firm size, Profitability, Industry concentration and Female share of industry (see Table 6 for definitions).  t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. The table only reports the second stage regression for 2SLS. We report the t-statistic 
on the instrument from the first stage regression at the bottom of each panel. 
***, ** and * denotes significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
 Family transition to next generation Family transition to all generations  
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
 
Wife’s age at marriage dummy as instrument for Number of adult children 


































         
















         
Control variables NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 

















         
t-statistic on instrument   (-3.64)  (-3.09)  (-9.06)  (-8.27) 
         
N 996 996 825 825 1,833 1,833 1,520 1,520 
         
 
Table 9, Succession in firms founded ten years after the owner’s last child was born 
The sample is constructed from family-controlled firms in which a single member of the controlling family is a 
shareholder.  From this initial sample, we keep only the firms that were founded 10 years after the owner’s last child was 
born.  Family transition is the dependent variable.  This variable takes the value of 1 when the CEO position is transferred 
to a family member.  We use two different definitions of family transition.  Under the columns labeled Family transition to 
next generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children in law. In these columns, CEO 
transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3).  Under the columns Family 
transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of children, spouse, siblings and 
parents).  Number of adult children is the number of children that were at least 20 years old.  All adult children are 
daughters is a dummy that takes the value 1 when all adult children are female. Old CEO in family is a dummy taking the 
value 1 if the departing CEO is a member of the controlling family.  Where indicated, we include the following unreported 
control variables: Firm size, Profitability, Industry concentration and Female share of industry (see Table 6 for 
definitions).  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
***, ** and * denotes significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 Family transition to next generation  Family transition to all generations 
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit 
     










     










     










     








     
Control variables NO YES NO YES 









     
Pseudo-R2 0.18 0.20 0.11 0.13 
N 581 473 1,308 1,072 
     
 
Table 10, Succession decision and marital status (conditional means) 
This table shows the frequency of family transitions conditional on marital status and in single owner family firms with a 
CEO transition as a function of the number of the children, the martial status and the number of partners with which the 
owner has children.  Under the columns labeled Family transition to next generation, we only include family transitions 
to children, step children and children in law. In these columns, CEO transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not 
considered transitions (see section 3). Under the columns Family transition to all generations we include all types of 
family transitions (i.e., to all types of children, spouse, siblings and parents).  The frequency of family transition (%FT) 
is the number of firms with family transition over the total number of transitions.  In Panel A we count all children, 
whereas in Panel B we only count children that were aged 20 or above at the time of the transition. 
 Owner martial status   Number of partners with which 
the owner has children 
 Never 
married 











 N %FT  N %FT  N %FT  N %FT   N %FT  N %FT 
 
Panel A: Family transition to next generation 
All 13 0.0  1,127 24.4  79 20.3  247 10.9   1,305 22.8  161 12.4 
 
Panel B: Family transition to all generations 
All 473 8.0  2,187 29.8  121 19.0  388 21.4   1,540 35.3  190 27.4 
                   
Table 11, Succession decision and marital status (probit regression) 
Family transition is the dependent variable.  This variable takes the value of 1 when the CEO position is transferred to a 
family member.  We use two different definitions of family transition.  Under the columns labeled Family transition to 
next generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children in law. In these columns, 
CEO transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3). Under the columns 
Family transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of children, spouse, 
siblings and parents).  Number of adult children is the number of children of the controlling owner that were at least 20 
years old at the time of the transition.  All adult children are daughters is a dummy taking the value 1 when all adult 
children are female.  Number of adult sons and Number of adult daughters are the number of sons and daughters, 
respectively, who are at least 20 years old at the time of the transition.  Multiple marriages is a dummy taking the value 
1 if the single controlling owner has been divorced and has remarried before the time of transition.  Old CEO in family 
is a dummy taking the value 1 when the departing CEO is a member of the controlling family.  Firm size is book value 
of assets measured in million Danish kroner (equivalent to 135,000 €).  Firm age is measured as number of years since 
the firm was established. Profitability is industry adjusted returns on assets, defined as operating profit over book value 
of assets minus the mean 2-digit SIC industry return on assets.  Industry concentration is the Herfindahl-Index, which 
sums the squares of each firm’s market share within the industry.  Female share of industry workforce is defined as the 
share of female workers in the industry. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
 Family transition to next generation  Family transition to all generations 
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit 
     




















     










     








     








     






























     
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 
N 1,466 1,203 3,169 2,617 
     
 
Table 12, Succession with exogenous marital status 
Family transition is the dependent variable.  This variable takes the value of 1 when the CEO position is transferred to a 
family member.  We use two different definitions of family transition.  Under the columns labeled Family transition to 
next generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children in law. In these columns, 
CEO transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3). Under the columns 
Family transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of children, spouse, 
siblings and parents).  Number of adult children is the number of children of the controlling owner that were at least 20 
years old at the time of the transition.  All adult children are daughters is a dummy taking the value 1 when all adult 
children are female.  Multiple marriage at least 5 years before transition is a dummy taking the value 1 if the owner 
remarried at least 5 years before the time of transition.  Old CEO in family is a dummy taking the value 1 when the 
departing CEO is a member of the controlling family.  Where indicated, we include the following unreported control 
variables: Firm size, Profitability, Industry concentration and Female share of industry (see Table 6 for definitions). 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
 Family transition to next generation  Family transition to all generations 
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit 
     










     










     










     
Multiple marriage at 










     








     
Control variables NO YES NO YES 









     
Pseudo-R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 
N 1,466 1,203 3,169 2,617 
     
 
Table 13, Effect of parental conflicts on family transition 
The sample is constructed from family-controlled firms in which a single member of the controlling family is a 
shareholder.  From this initial sample, we keep only the firms in which the owner was married at the time of the transition.  
Family transition is the dependent variable.  This variable takes the value of 1 when the CEO position is transferred to a 
family member.  We use two different definitions of family transition.  Under the columns labeled Family transition to next 
generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children in law. In these columns, CEO 
transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3).  Under the columns Family 
transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of children, spouse, siblings and 
parents).  Number of adult children is the number of children that were at least 20 years old.  All adult children are 
daughters is a dummy that takes the value 1 when all adult children are female.  Divorced after transition is our proxy for 
conflicts. It takes the value of 1 if the owner divorced two years after the transition.  Old CEO in family is a dummy taking 
the value 1 if the departing CEO is a member of the controlling family.  Where indicated, we include the following 
unreported control variables: Firm size, Profitability, Industry concentration and Female share of industry (see Table 6 for 
definitions).  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
***, ** and * denotes significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 Family transition to next generation   Family transition to all generations 
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit 
     






























     










     








     
Control variables? NO YES NO YES 
     
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11 
N 1,186 977 2,276 1,890 
     
 
Table 14, Family conflicts: the effect of having children with multiple spouses on succession 
The sample is constructed from family-controlled firms in which a single member of the controlling family is a 
shareholder.  From this initial sample, we keep only the firms in which the owner has been married at least once.  
Family transition is the dependent variable.  This variable takes the value of 1 when the CEO position is transferred to a 
family member.  We use two different definitions of family transition.  Under the columns labeled Family transition to 
next generation, we only include family transitions to children, step children and children in law. In these columns, 
CEO transitions to spouses, siblings and parents are not considered transitions (see section 3).  Under the columns 
Family transition to all generations we include all types of family transitions (i.e., to all types of children, spouse, 
siblings and parents).  Number of adult children is the number of children of the controlling owner that were at least 20 
years old at the time of the transition.  All adult children are daughters is a dummy taking the value 1 when all adult 
children are female.  Divorced, but never remarried is a dummy taking the value 1 if the single owner is divorced and 
has not remarried. Multiple marriages but children with one partner is a dummy taking the value 1 if the single owner 
has been divorced and has remarried, but only has children from one spouse.  Multiple marriages and children with 
multiple partners is a dummy taking the value 1 if the family owner has been divorced, has remarried and has children 
with multiple partners. Multiple marriages but sons with one partner is a dummy taking the value 1 if the single owner 
has been divorced and has remarried, but only has sons from one marriage.  Multiple marriages and sons with multiple 
partners is a dummy taking the value 1 if the family owner has been divorced, has remarried and has sons with multiple 
partners.  Old CEO in family is a dummy taking the value 1 if the departing CEO was a family member. Where 
indicated we include the following unreported control variables: Firm size, Profitability, Industry concentration and 
Female share of industry (see Table 6 for definitions.  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
 Family transition to  
next generation  
 Family transition to  
all generations 
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
       


























       














Multiple marriages but 










Multiple marriages and 










Multiple marriages and sons 
w/ one partner 
  -0.275** 
(-2.03) 
  -0.212** 
(-2.28) 
Multiple marriages and sons 
w/ multiple partners 
  -0.620* 
(-1.83) 
  -0.368 
(-1.57) 














       












       
Control variables NO YES YES NO YES YES 













       
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 
N 1,466 1,203 1,203 2,696 2,234 2,234 
       
    
  
Table 15, Determinants of Ownership Transition 
We use a sample of single family member family firms where a new owner entered the firm. Family transition is the 
dependent variable, defined as a dummy taking the value 1 when one of the new owners belongs to the next generation 
and to all generations of the family, respectively. We use two different samples of family firms, Ownership transition to 
next generation, which includes all transitions to outsiders and only family transitions to the next generation, and 
Ownership transition to all generations, which includes all transitions to outsiders and all family transitions (see 
Section 2 for further details). Number of adult children is the number of children of the single controlling owner that 
was aged 20 at the time of the transition. Never married is a dummy taking the value 1 if the single owner never has 
been married. Multiple marriages is a dummy taking the value 1 if the single controlling owner has been divorced and 
has remarried before the time of transition. All adult children are daughters is a dummy taking the value 1 if all adult 
children are daughters. Number of male children and Number of female children are the number of adult male and 
female children, respectively. Old CEO in family is a dummy taking the value 1 if the departing CEO was a family 
member. Firm size is book value of assets measured in million Danish kroner (equivalent to 135,000 €). Firm age is 
measured as number of years since the firm was established. Profitability is industry adjusted returns on assets, defined 
as operating profit over book value of assets minus the mean 2-digit SIC industry return on assets.  Industry 
concentration is the Herfindahl-Index, which sums the squares of each firm’s market share within the industry. Female 
share of industry workforce is defined as the share of female in the workforce within the industry. t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis.  
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
 Ownership transition to  
next generation 
 Ownership transition to  
all generations 
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit 
     


































     










     








     
Control variables NO YES NO YES 









     
Pseudo-R2 0.14 0.13 0.25 0.25 
N 
 
2,454 1,958 4,830 3,825 
Table 16, Determinants of succession using a more strict definition of family firm 
We construct a sample of family firms with a controlling family and family involvement, i.e. at least two family 
members among the group of owners, CEO and board members – see Table 1 and Section 2 for further details.  Family 
transition is the dependent variable, defined as a dummy taking the value 1 when the CEO position is transferred to the 
next generation and to all generations, respectively. We use two different samples, Family transition to next generation, 
which includes all transitions to outsiders and only family transitions to the next generation, and Family transition to all 
generations, which includes all transitions to outsiders and all family transitions (see Section 2 for further details) 
Number of adult children is the sum of the family owners’ children that was aged 20 at the time of the transition. 
Multiple marriages is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least one family owner has been divorced and have remarried. 
Majority of children are daughters is a dummy taking the value 1 if the majority of the family owners’ adult children 
are daughters. Old CEO in family is a dummy taking the value 1 if the departing CEO was a family member. Where 
indicated we include the following unreported control variables: Firm size, Profitability, Industry concentration and 
Female share of industry (see Table 6 for definitions.  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
 Family transition to next generation   Family transition to all generations 
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit 
     




















     








     
Majority of adult 









     








     
Control variables NO YES NO YES 
     
Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.10 
N 1,099 901 1,606 1,330 
     
 
  
  
